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Abstract: 
 
Guarantee transactions have generated an enormous volume of litigation 
over the past 20 years in Australian and elsewhere. There have been 
numerous major reports referring to the problem of relationship debt in 
recent years as concern about guarantee transactions has grown.  
 
This article outlines the major findings of  the first comprehensive 
Australian empirical research into the law and practices governing third 
party guarantees. The research was directed to finding out more about the 
experiences of the people who agree to guarantee the loans of others. Why 
do they sign on, how do they get into trouble in those transactions and 
what might have assisted them in avoiding such difficulties?   
 
Despite measures such as the Consumer Credit Code (1996) and the Code 
of Banking Practice (1993)(2003), guarantee practice shows little evidence 
of what either the finance industry or consumer advocates would regard as 
best, or even adequate, practice. 
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Third party guarantees are undertaken when a credit provider will not 
lend money, or will not extend a loan, unless the loan is secured by a 
guarantee provided by a person other than the borrower. This third person 
may not be involved in, or benefit from, the loan transaction itself. Unlike 
most contractual arrangements, this transaction is not an arm’s length 
transaction because of the close relationship between the borrower and 
guarantor. 
 
Guarantee transactions have generated an enormous volume of litigation 
in the past 20 years. There have been numerous major reports referring to 
the problem of relationship debt in recent years as concern about 
guarantee transactions has grown.1 This article outlines the major 
findings of  the first comprehensive Australian empirical research into the 
practice of third party guarantees.2  
 
The Research 
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1 See for example, Australia, Trade Practices Commission, Guarantors: Problems and Perspectives 
(1992); Australia, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration, A Pocket Full of Change: Banking and Deregulation (AGPS, 1991); the report of the 
Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability Good Relations, High Risks – Financial Transactions 
within families and between friends (Commonwealth Attorney-General, 1996); Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Equality Before the Law: Women’s Equality (Report 69, Part 2, 1994); Radmila Jukic, 
Till Debt do us Part (Consumer Credit Legal Service, Melbourne, 1994); Supriya Singh, For Love Not 
Money: Women, Information and the Family Business (Consumer Advocacy and Financial Counselling 
Association of Victoria Inc, 1995). For a discussion of the regulatory context in which guarantee 
transactions take place, see: Reg Graycar, Robyn Johansson and Jenny Lovric, “Guaranteeing Someone 
Else’s Debts” (2001) 12 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 181. 
 
2 This project was carried out in partnership between the Faculty of Law at the University of Sydney 
and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission between 2000 and 2003 with funding made 
available by an Australian Research Council Strategic Partnerships in Industry, Research and Training 
grant. The full report appears as, Darling, Please Sign This Form: A Report on the Practice of Third 
Party Guarantees in New South Wales, NSWLRC Research Report 11, October 2003, 
NSWLRC/University of Sydney online at http://www.agd.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/rr11toc This 
research report provides empirical data to inform the NSW LRC inquiry, Guaranteeing Someone Else’s 
Debts, which will report on reform of the law of guarantees in late 2004.  
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 While we learn some things about guarantee transactions from judgments 
of cases that are litigated when things “go wrong”, these cases are not 
necessarily helpful in gaining an understanding of what is occurring more 
broadly. Litigated cases represent a very small percentage of disputed 
matters, the vast majority of which settle prior to, or during, litigation. 
Litigated cases also do not give any sense of transactions that are not 
disputed; either because they are unproblematic, or because the guarantor 
did not dispute the loan when it was called upon (for example if they sold 
their property to pay it, or went bankrupt). Therefore, drawing 
information only from cases that proceed to litigation may be misleading 
when policy-makers and researchers are trying to determine what the key 
issues are in guarantee transactions.  
In this research we wanted to ascertain whether widespread assumptions 
about the make-up of guarantors – that they are largely women, 
predominantly the wives of men operating small businesses and 
frequently from non-English speaking backgrounds – could be confirmed. 
We also wanted to consider whether numerous solutions that have been 
proposed to address the problems of guarantee transactions – such as 
“cooling off” periods after signing a guarantee allowing for a guarantor to 
withdraw, or requiring the provision of legal advice or financial advice 
before signing – would make any difference to whether and how 
guarantors entered into such transactions. 
In the early 1990s Belinda Fehlberg conducted the first empirical research 
into the issue of third party guarantees when she undertook a small-scale 
qualititative study in the United Kingdom. Fehlberg’s in-depth research 
comprised interviews with 22 guarantors (whom she refers to as 
“sureties”), five borrowers, nine lenders and 13 lawyers.3 Fehlberg’s 
research focused only upon guarantors who had supported the loan of a 
spouse or de facto partner. A major theme to emerge from that research 
was the guarantors viewed themselves as having no real choice about 
providing security for the borrower’s debt. Reasons for this ranged from 
emotional pressure to threats and physical violence, and Fehlberg noted 
that economic dependence on the borrower was a key aspect in 
constraining the guarantors’ choice.  
We were particularly interested to see whether the Australian experience 
was similar and whether many of Fehlberg’s key findings would be 
repeated in a larger and more broadly recruited sample. We were also 
interested in determining whether there were other vulnerable groups 
affected by guarantees, such as elderly parents and family members in 
families from non-English speaking backgrounds. We considered that 
                                            
3 Belinda Fehlberg, Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law (Clarendon Press, 
1997). 
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issues of power, choice and economic dependence identified by Fehlberg in 
the context of couple guarantors may also be active in other contexts. 
This research was directed to finding out more about the experiences of 
the people who agree to guarantee the loans of others. Why do they sign 
on, how do they get into trouble in those transactions and what might 
have assisted them in avoiding such difficulties?   
 The research took place between 2000 and 2003. This project sought both 
qualitative and quantitative data from guarantors, lenders, solicitors, 
barristers and judges.  The data collected from guarantors and their 
advisers was compared with data collated from judgments from the courts 
(including those in published reports and unreported cases available 
through internet sources) in order to consider if there were significant 
variation between the demographics and experiences of litigants and non-
litigants.4 The project sought information from lenders about their 
practice through a confidential survey, but received very little assistance 
or input from that sector.5
 
Qualitative data was collected primarily by interviewing guarantors. 
Information about guarantee transactions was also sought from legal 
advisers who had acted for guarantors during the transaction and also 
those who had acted for either guarantors or lenders when post-
transaction difficulties arose. The views of barristers and judges were 
sought specifically about the litigation phase of guarantee disputes.6 
Quantitative data was collected by use of tick box questionnaires which 
were sent directly to solicitors, barristers and judges, made available on 
the Commission’s website, and publicised to the general community 
through avenues such as radio advertisements, radio talk-back and news 
features.7  
                                            
4 The case law review comprised reported and unreported cases involving third party guarantees 
decided since Garcia v National Australia Bank (1998) 194 CLR 395. The research team developed a 
digest of 52 recent cases from 1998 to October 2002, summarising the facts of each case, the claims or 
defences and the court’s decision and other key pieces of information. A set of 30 key issues were 
identified for inquiry, mirroring the issues raised in the guarantor, solicitor and barrister surveys 
 
5 Survey documents were sent to 112 lenders including banks, building societies, credit unions and 
finance companies. Responses were received from only two major banks, two smaller bank lenders and 
three finance companies. We were also assisted by responses from two peak bodies. 
 
6 Of the 89 solicitors and 47 barristers who responded to our surveys, there was an even division 
between those who had acted last for a guarantor and those who had acted last for a lender. The fact 
that we had lawyers who had acted for both sides in disputed transactions assisted us in gaining a more 
representative view of transactions. The fact that demographic data about guarantors drawn from legal 
representatives largely mirrored that drawn from guarantors themselves and from litigated cases 
enhances the validity of this data. A total of 46 judges responded to our judge survey, giving us a 
further point of comparison. 
 
7 Of the 87 guarantors who responded to our survey, we had broad geographical coverage. Of 71 
respondents who were resident in New South Wales, 30 came from regional NSW. If not otherwise 
indicated, all quotes below come from guarantor respondents. 
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It is relatively common for lenders to claim that while bad practices may 
have existed in the past, lenders are now closely regulated and are 
considerably more prudent in taking guarantees following various 
developments in court decisions on point.8 Over half of the guarantors who 
participated in our survey had entered the transaction between the years 
1993 and 2002. Therefore a reasonable proportion of the data collected by 
the project reflects the way transactions have been conducted in recent 
years. Many of the transactions reported to us by guarantors were clearly 
undertaken since (and in spite of) significant reforms such as the 
Australian Bankers’ Association Code of Banking Practice (1993), the 
introduction of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (operative since 1996), 
the extension of unconscionability provisions in trade practices legislation 
to cover small business (1998) and the High Court decision of Garcia v 
National Australia Bank  (1998).9
 
Many of our findings confirmed existing suppositions drawn from 
anecdotal reports and litigated cases. For example we found a high 
proportion of female guarantors supporting the borrowing of male 
partners who were engaged in small business.  Some of our findings were 
surprising. For instance we did not expect to find such a high proportion of 
older guarantors, many of whom were supporting the borrowing of adult 
children. We were also surprised to find that a relatively small proportion  
of guarantors received legal advice prior to the transaction, and of the 
guarantors who did receive advice, they reported a high level of poor 
practice on the part of solicitors. A high level of reported poor practice on 
the part of lenders was also unexpected, given how many inquiries and 
reforms have been undertaken in this area in recent years. 
 
We were interested to discover that in many ways the data we drew from 
our survey of guarantors did reflect that found in the available litigated 
cases. Our guarantor respondents were very similar to litigants in the case 
law pool we examined in areas such as: their gender, non-English 
speaking background and relationship with the guarantor. They were 
equally likely to have signed the guarantee documentation in the presence 
of the borrower. We were unable to determine the age of many litigants, 
but noted that many of them were guarantors for the loans of adult 
children; suggesting an age range of over 50, which correlated fairly 
                                                                                                                             
 
8 Fehlberg, n 3,  Chapter 7. 
 
9 Garcia v National Australia Bank (1998) 194 CLR 395. 
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closely with the  large proportion of guarantor respondents over the age of 
50.  
The areas in which the two groups differed are also noteworthy. We found 
that compared to litigants, our guarantors were supporting loans for 
smaller sums of money, were more likely to sign the documents in 
informal circumstances and were half as likely to have received legal 
advice prior to signing the guarantee. Litigants were more likely than our 
guarantor respondents to be supporting a business loan, to have 
mortgaged the family home as part of the guarantee, and to have signed 
an “All Moneys” clause as part of the guarantee.  
 
 
Securing Family Business Borrowing 
 
The research found that the vast majority of third party guarantees are 
undertaken to support small business borrowing, primarily family 
business.10  Such businesses are typically owned and run by men.11 
Earlier research by Singh and Fehlberg has demonstrated that while a 
female partner may be listed as a shareholder or director in a family 
company, she is rarely in a position of any real control over the company.12 
Fehlberg concluded from her research that “women, and particularly 
economically-dependent women in middle and higher-income households, 
are likely to be called upon to provide security and to find it difficult to 
refuse if asked.”13  
 
When we examined business loans specifically, we found that guarantors 
were typically supporting the borrowing of a business over which they had 
little control. Thirty-eight  per cent of guarantors surveyed had “no role” in 
the business whose loans they guaranteed; another 9% identified 
themselves as having “no formal role” in the business. A further 20% of 
our guarantors respondents were “silent” directors of the business. Only 
16% were active directors of the business whose loan they had 
                                            
10 The review of litigated cases, solicitor, barrister and guarantor surveys all revealed substantial 
proportions of loans made for business purposes.  Of the litigated cases, 94% related to a business loan. 
Barristers and solicitors reported 70% and 98% of guarantees were for business loans respectively the 
last time they dealt with a third party guarantee transaction.  The survey of guarantors found 49% of 
loans relating to a business purpose, a lower but still considerable proportion. 
 
11 See eg Kosmas Smyrnios, Claudio Romano and George Tanewski, The Australian Family and 
Private Business Survey 1997 (Monash University, 1997); Price Waterhouse/Commonwealth Bank 
Family Business Survey of 5000 businesses (1995) 11 Company Director 20. 
 
12 Fehlberg, n 3; Supriya Singh, n 1. 
 
13 Fehlberg, n 3 at 89. 
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guaranteed.14 A closer analysis of this data reveals that the largest 
percentage of guarantors were women with no formal role in the business 
for which they provided a guarantee. This accords with Fehlberg’s study in 
the UK in which half of the guarantors described themselves as having no 
role in the business for which they secured a loan.15
 
The majority of guarantees in our study were for loans in excess of 
$100,000.16 We were interested to discover whether guarantees were being 
sought to support finance for businesses that were starting up or 
expanding, or for business that was in difficulty or had loans that were 
already problematic. From our survey it appears that expansion, rather 
than start-up or later difficulties, was the principle reason for the loan. Of 
the guarantors who were supporting a business loan, 25% reported that 
the loan was for a new business, 19% reported that it was to get the 
business through a difficult time (although a further 8% of respondents 
said that it involved refinance of an existing loan), while 38% stated that 
the purpose was to expand or develop an existing business.  
 
This data is somewhat at odds with that in Belinda Fehlberg’s study. 
Although a similar proportion of loans were for business expansion, only 
one guarantee in Fehlberg’s study involved support for a new business and 
the majority of guarantees were for a business in trouble.17 However 
Fehlberg notes that whether a business was in trouble or was new or 
expanding, debtors were rarely in a position to objectively present the 
risks inherent in the guarantee. Whether in a state of financial pressure 
or high optimism, borrowers were highly partial and selective in the 
manner in which they presented their business to the guarantor.18
 
We were unable to ascertain the number or proportion of guarantees that 
are called upon in any given period, or that result in the repossession of 
security such as residential homes, as lenders were unable or unwilling to 
disclose this information. Nor could we discover the number or proportion 
of debts which are disputed by guarantors. 
 
Who are guarantors  
                                            
14 Of the remaining 18%, most were partners in a partnership arrangement.  
 
15 Fehlberg, n 3 at 138. Fehlberg also noted a distinct trend for women who were “involved” to work 
for the business either unpaid or paid at just below the tax threshold: at 140. 
 
16 Solicitors and barristers reported significantly larger amounts at stake in the transactions they last 
dealt with.   
 
17 Fehlberg, n 3 at 163. 
 
18 Fehlberg, n 3 at 164. 
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Although it has been noted that, “Trusting wives and elderly parents from 
non-English speaking backgrounds are familiar characters in Australian 
contract law”19, there is very little information about those who guarantee 
loans for others beyond the law reports. A major aim of this research was 
to more fully investigate the extent of the experiences of, and problems 
faced by third party guarantors who do not appear in the litigated cases.  
 
Gender and relationships 
 
The survey of guarantors revealed almost two-thirds of those who 
guaranteed loans were women.20  
 
This research did not explicitly seek guarantors who had signed 
guarantees in the context of close personal relationships. However, the 
results did reveal that the vast majority of guarantees or joint loans were 
signed by close family relatives: mostly spouses, followed by parents of 
borrowers.  
 
The survey of guarantors revealed that 83% of guarantors were in a close 
personal relationship with the borrower. Of these, 39% of loans were 
guaranteed by a partner or spouse of the primary borrower; 26% had 
signed as a guarantor for a loan for their adult child, and 18% had signed 
for another relative.21 The review of litigated cases22 and data from 
solicitors23 and barristers24  revealed very similar results. The graph 
below indicates the relationships reported according to each source of 
data. 
 
 
 
                                            
19 Sue Mahalingham, “Deep and Meaningful: Dealing with Emotionally Transmitted Debt” (1999) 3(6) 
Consumer Rights Journal. 
 
20 This was very closely mirrored in the review of litigated cases which revealed that 65% of guarantors 
were female, while 15% were male (in the remaining 19% of cases, the guarantors were groupings of 
family members, predominantly husbands and wives as co-guarantors or co-borrowers). 
 
21 A further 7% signed for a friend; 8% signed for a business associate and the remaining 2% signed 
either for a business entity or their own company. 
 
22 Ninety per cent of the guarantors in a close relationship with the borrower.  
 
23 The survey of solicitors revealed that the last time they gave advice in relation to a guarantee over 
three quarters of the guarantors and borrowers were in a close personal relationship. 
 
24 The barrister survey statistics also revealed over half of guarantors were in close personal 
relationships with the borrower.  
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When we examined the relationship figures by gender it was clear that 
women principally undertake guarantees as the wives or de facto partners 
of male borrowers. Very few men guarantee the debts of a spouse, and 
those men who were guarantors were most likely to have guaranteed the 
loan of an adult child. 
 
Age 
 
The respondents to the guarantor survey were generally from higher age 
brackets, with 65% of respondents over the age of 50.  
 
Under 30 years
6% 30-39 years
8%
40-49 years
21%
50-59 years
28%
60 years and over
37%
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These statistics indicate that older people are disproportionately 
represented in problematic third party guarantee transactions.25 
Commentators have noted that older people are particularly liable to be 
asked to guarantee adult children’s debts because they are likely to be in 
possession of valuable security: an unencumbered residential home.26
 
 
Men appear particularly likely to be guarantors as later in life: only 8 
male guarantors were under the age of 50, while 21 were over. However, it 
should be noted that in every age range women outnumbered men, and so 
men over 50 were still far less heavily affected than women over 50.27  
 
 
Country of birth and language background 
 
A considerable proportion of respondents to the guarantor survey were 
overseas-born or did not speak English as their first language. Around 
40% of our guarantor survey respondents were born outside Australia – 
this is around double the level of overseas-born residents in the general 
Australian population.28  
 
Twenty per cent of respondents to the guarantor survey spoke a language 
other than English as their first language. This proportion was reflected in 
the other date collected.29 Of those who indicated that English was their 
second language, the majority indicated that their level of spoken English 
was weak or fair,30 while half reported their understanding of written 
English was weak.31 This suggests significant issues for many guarantors 
                                            
25 According to data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (“ABS”), 12.4% of the Australian 
population in 2001 was aged 65 years or older: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social 
Trends 2002, Cat. No. 4192.0 (ABS, Canberra, 2002) at 2.  
 
26 See Fiona Burns, “Undue Influence and the Elderly” (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 
499; Juliet Lucy Cummins, “Relationship Debt and the Aged: Welfare and Commerce in the Law of 
Guarantees” (2002) 27 Alternative Law Journal 63. 
 
27 39% of the guarantors were women of fifty or over, while 24% were men of that age.  
 
28 Guarantor Survey, Question 1. The 2001 Census reports 22% of Australia’s population is born 
overseas: see Census 2001 Cat. No. 2015.0 (ABS, Canberra, 2002).  
 
29 The barrister survey data reveals that over one-fifth of their clients were from a non-English speaking 
background. Most judges reported that many trials had a third party guarantor from a non-English 
speaking background. In our review of litigated cases we found that 42% of cases involved guarantors 
from a non-English speaking background. 
 
30 Of 18 respondents in this category, three reported their understanding of spoken English as weak 
while eight said it was fair. three stated that it was good and four very good. 
 
31 Of 18 respondents in this category, eight reported that their understanding of written English was 
weak, two reported it was fair, four good and four very good. 
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with language and their ability to understand written and spoken 
information about the guarantee transaction.  
 
Also noteworthy is the fact that solicitors reported that the last time they 
gave advice in relation to a guarantor prior to signing the guarantee, only 
5% of such clients were from a non-English speaking background.  This 
suggests that guarantors from non-English speaking backgrounds are not 
receiving advice prior to signing guarantees: a time where advice as to 
liability under a guarantee contract is critical.  
 
 
Why do they sign 
 
 
Third party guarantors often have much to lose and little, if anything, to 
gain from entering the transaction. An important task of the research 
project was to try to ascertain why someone would undertake so onerous 
an obligation.  
Guarantors generally agree to the transaction for emotional rather than 
financial reasons, with a significant proportion of guarantors reporting 
that they agreed to the transaction because they did not want to damage 
their relationship with the borrower by refusing. While many guarantors 
had some insight into the risky nature of the transaction or had 
misgivings, they still went ahead with it. This is consistent with Belinda 
Fehlberg’s findings in her UK study.32  
Guarantors gave a range of reasons for signing. These included: trust in 
the borrower, optimism, misunderstanding or misinformation about the 
transaction, individual pressure from the borrower ranging from 
emotional pressure to threats or coercion, and more general pressures 
such as cultural and family pressure to support a borrower. It was clear 
that many guarantors signed because they felt that they had no choice but 
to sign, especially in situations of economic dependence on the borrower. 
Clearly, many of these reasons cannot be easily translated into discrete 
and identifiable legal claims or categories.  
 
Some women who provide guarantees for the business enterprise of their 
husband are likely to be influenced in their decision making by their 
economic dependence on their spouse, particularly where they primarily 
perform unpaid work and the spouse performs more or better-paid work. 
Belinda Fehlberg argues that economic dependence in heterosexual 
couples, particularly when women are primarily involved in child-care, 
means that “men are both likely to have greater control over domestic 
                                                                                                                             
 
32 Fehlberg, n 3 at 165. 
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financial arrangements, and to feel more entitled to mobilize the available 
resources for their personal use.”33 Fehlberg found in her UK study that 
non-income earning wives with children had the least power over family 
finances.34
 
While we did not specifically ask guarantors about whether they were 
economically dependent upon the borrower, or about whether the borrower 
controlled family finances, it was clear from several responses, discussed 
below, that this was the case. Almost one-third of the respondents to the 
guarantor survey reported that they signed because the borrower made 
the financial decisions in their relationship and that they just did as they 
were told with respect to these transactions. A further 17% reported that 
they were partners and it seemed right to share – of these the great 
majority were women. 
 
 
The factors explored below reflect the categories that we asked guarantors 
to respond to as reasons why they entered into the transaction. While 
focusing upon these specific responses we do not mean to suggest that 
structural inequalities are not present.35 Indeed, they inform many of the 
comments made by guarantors. Structural gender inequalities include a 
greater likelihood of women’s economic dependence upon a male partner 
who is the primary borrower engendered typically by prime responsibility 
for child care and consequent broken workforce participation. Structural 
inequalities arising from economic imbalance and dependence many also 
be present in other types of relationship, for  instance to the large number 
of elderly guarantors who were supporting the borrowing of adult children. 
Although elderly guarantors are comparatively asset rich – often it is an 
unencumbered home that is the security for the loan – they are liable to be 
income poor. In such situations, adult children may be an important 
source of income support or future security. 
 
 
Trust and Optimism 
 
“My role was a housewife. I had to trust my husband and I did.” 
 
                                            
33 Ibid at 85. 
 
34 Ibid, Chapter 4.  
 
35 For a discussion of structural inequality and gender in guarantee transactions see eg: Paula Barron, 
“The Exercise of Her Free Will: Women and Emotionally Transmitted Debt” (1995) 13 Law in Context 
23; Miranda Kaye, “Equity’s Treatment of Sexually Transmitted Debt” (1997) 5 Feminist Legal 
Studies 35; Kristie Dunn, “Yakking Giants: Equality Discourse in the High Court” (2000) 24 
Melbourne University Law Review 427; Nicola Howell, ‘Sexually Transmitted Debt: A Feminist 
Analysis of Laws Regulating Guarantors and Co-Borrowers” (1995) 4 Australian Feminist Law 
Journal 93. 
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“I trusted my husband and the bank officer to do the right thing.” 
 
The decision to enter into a guarantee to secure a family member’s loan is 
often informed by factors other a sound commercial ones, and undertaken 
without any assessment of risk. Three-quarters of guarantor respondents 
reported one of the reasons they signed the guarantee was because they 
trusted the borrower. Notably, many guarantors reported that wouldn’t 
think of openly questioning the request to act as guarantor because this 
would indicate a lack of trust.36
 
Optimism in the other person’s ability to repay the debt is often informed 
by the desire to help another family member get ahead, a high degree of 
personal trust in the borrower or a desire to affirm a developing 
relationship.37 Belinda Fehlberg noted in her UK study that when the 
loan was to support a new business, there was a high degree of optimism 
both from the borrower and their guarantor spouse, most of whom 
described themselves as, “happy to support the debtor because they 
believed in his or her abilities and therefore believed that the business 
would be successful.”38
 
 
In our survey of guarantors the respondents were not asked specifically 
whether they were optimistic about the transaction. However, 44% said 
they didn’t think signing involved any serious risk and the same portion 
responded that they thought the transaction was for the family’s financial 
benefit.  
 
The Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman (“the ABIO”) states that:   
 
“The experience of the ABIO is that a common response to a 
guarantee being called up is one of shock on the part of debtors and 
guarantors. It is rare to find a case where a guarantee has been 
signed with any expectation that is will be called upon or with any 
financial planning being done to prepare for this occurring...[t]his 
may be influenced in particular cases by statements by the debtor 
or the lender or both that “your house is not at risk”. It may result 
                                            
36 In its submission to New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Guaranteeing Someone Else’s 
Debts (Issues Paper 17, 2000), the Country Women’s Association of NSW noted that “all too often the 
guarantee is between family members and asking for this information may be seen as distrusting or 
doubting the family member. This can be a very emotive issue and one sometimes hears a party state 
‘Well, I didn’t like to ask him for that information in case he thought I didn’t trust him’”: Country 
Women’s Association of NSW, Submission at 2.  
 
37 See Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability, n 1 at 10. 
 
38 Fehlberg, n 3 at 131. See also 185-188. 
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from a natural unwillingness on the part of the guarantor to believe 
that the worst will happen.” 39
 
This was confirmed in our research. Eighty-two per cent of respondents to 
our guarantor survey reported that when they found out there was a 
problem with the debt, it came as a big shock for them. 
 
 
Choice 
 
“I felt I was in a trap. I felt I had no choice. Finally I reluctantly agreed to 
provide a mortgage to secure the loan.” 
 
 
Whether the guarantor actually had a choice about whether they signed is 
not a straightforward issue. While there may ostensibly be a choice about 
whether someone signs a guarantee, the choice may be often more notional 
than real.  
 
Over one-third of respondents said they did not feel that they had a choice 
about whether they signed the documents. Of those who reported this as a 
reason they signed, the great majority were women.40 This is consistent 
with the findings of Belinda Fehlberg’s UK study, which found that 
“Sureties consistently said that at the time of signing, they felt they had 
no choice about whether or not to sign.”41
 
The absence of choice must be broken down to better understand what 
people meant when they say they didn’t feel they had a choice. Sometimes 
it meant that they were under pressure or duress to sign, such as facing 
threats of physical violence. Sometimes it referred to an overbearing sense 
of obligation, such that the guarantors feared that a relationship would be 
irreparably damaged if they refused.  
 
Fehlberg noted that for five of her guarantors, “the idea that they had a 
choice had never entered their minds. It was just assumed by themselves, 
and by all around them, that they would sign. In the context of their 
relationship with the debtor, signing was an automatic reaction.”42 
Likewise, our review of the litigated cases found that it was not 
                                            
39 Colin Neave, Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman, AFC Conference Paper, February 2000 at 
13-15; see also Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman, Report on Relationship Debt Bulletin No 22, 
September 1999. 
 
40 Five men and 24 women  said that they didn’t think they had any choice when they signed. 
 
41 Fehlberg, n 3 at 181. 
 
42 Ibid at 181. 
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uncommon for women sign guarantees for their husbands, in particular, 
for no other reason than that they were asked to sign. In these cases there 
was clearly no consideration of the merits or benefits of the transaction. 
Such unquestioning acquiescence tends to indicate that any choice, or any 
discussion about the matter, may be more apparent than real for those 
women – they did as they were told. For example, in Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia v  Stavrianos and Ors , Mrs Stavrianos gave evidence of how 
she would be asked to sign documents by her husband: “He was asking me 
to sign it, not whether I would. "Darling, please sign this form" would be 
the way he would put it.“43 (emphasis added) 
 
In some instances, there was really no other option but to sign if the 
guarantor wished to remain in their relationship with the borrower. One 
barrister commented: 
 “for the sake of domestic harmony there is usually irresistible 
pressure on the guaranteeing spouse to sign.” 
 
Fehlberg notes that this can entail a combination of both economic and 
emotional pressure which means that for the guarantor the question of 
choice became “largely irrelevant”.44  
 
Dependency, vulnerability and absence of real choice do not always fall 
into the neat legal category of “undue influence;”45 nor does it necessarily 
fall within the parameters of unconscionability. Several respondents felt 
that they were under an emotional or moral obligation to help family or 
repay assistance from other family members.  
 
The guarantor survey found that many parents who assisted their 
children with loans did so out of a sense of moral obligation. Comments 
included: 
 
“It was for my daughter and I would do anything for my children.” 
 
“we are family. It is the right thing to do for your family.”  
 
The issue of choice was also connected to pressure and threats of violence. 
Vulnerability to pressure was implicit in many of the responses from 
guarantors in our surveys. 
 
                                            
43 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Stavrianos (Unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 12224/94, 
Graham AJ, 17 October 1997). 
 
44 Fehlberg, n 3 at 181. 
 
45 See Janine Pascoe, “Wives, Lenders and Guarantees – New Law in the UK and Lessons for 
Australia” (2002) 17 Australian Banking and Finance Law Bulletin 117 at 124. 
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Pressure  
 
“I was too scared not to sign – he’d leave or kill me.”  
 
In Fehlberg’s UK study, she found that pressure ranged from actual 
physical violence to more subtle forms of emotional pressure.46 Our 
observations were consistent with these findings; many guarantors 
reported they felt signed because of a range of pressure of various kinds.  
 
Guarantors reported a large amount of emotional pressure.  
 
“I felt embarrassed and foolish. I was on my own at the time and 
probably vulnerable trying to do things on my own. Very 
emotionally drained, under pressure from the other person who 
harassed me for a further guarantee for funds. I felt bullied.”  
 
“My husband and I worked our whole life…my husband died and 
almost immediately my son began pestering me for a loan…my son 
was putting highly intense pressure on me…” 
 
Solicitors also commented that family pressure is one of the main why 
guarantors sign, despite being advised against doing it. Such emotional 
pressure is also reflected in the reported cases.47
 
Guarantors also reported pressure that amounted to harassment or direct 
threat: 
 
“I had one week to sign but I was hassled every day. Even the 
neighbours knew what was going on we were yelling so much. What 
could I do? I had 2 small children and he’d leave if I didn’t sign.”  
 
“I was really harassed. Fearful of physical threats, and I lost sight 
of perspective. He [the borrower] was aggro – out of control.”  
 
Of 16 guarantor respondents who reported that they were “too scared not 
to sign”, 14 were women. Among other comments offered by guarantors to 
explain why they signed, several women but only one man reported 
threats, harassment or pressure to sign. 
 
Culture and Ethnicity 
 
                                            
46 Fehlberg, n 3 at 267. 
 
47 See eg Pasternacki v Correy [2001] ANZ ConvR 240; [2000] NSWCA 333. 
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Cultural factors concerning the way people perceive their role and 
responsibilities within their community and family are significant. The 
Expert Working Group on Family Financial Responsibility and the 
Australian Law Reform Commission identified cultural attitudes and 
immigration as further complications in guarantee transactions.48 
Cultural obligations and responsibilities mean that a guarantor may feel 
obliged to provide assistance to family members and other members of 
their community with no consideration of the commercial viability of the 
transaction.  
 
These issues were clearly borne out in a number of responses from 
guarantors. For example, Mr V a 74 year old pensioner, with a University 
education in Vietnam reported that he mortgaged his home to assist his 
son-in-law develop a shopping centre. When the son-in-law didn’t make 
his repayments, the bank claimed possession of Mr V’s home.  The son-in-
law had sponsored Mr V to Australia many years ago. Because of this Mr 
V felt “indebted to him and felt obliged to help him” to repay this “debt” of 
sponsorship.  Even though the son-in-law subsequently left his daughter 
and became a successful businessman, Mr V said that he would do the 
same again “because of the family situation and especially the 
sponsoring”.49 Another guarantor of non English speaking background 
agreed to provide security over his home to guarantee a loan for the 
benefit of some friends because the friends were new immigrants.  
 
 
Misunderstandings and misinformation about the transaction 
 
 
Our research confirmed the findings of earlier reports that many 
guarantors sign without an understanding of the nature of the 
transaction.50 Guarantors experience both factual and legal 
misunderstandings about the transaction as a result of 
misrepresentations, failure to read or understand the documents, lack of 
competent legal and financial advice, lack of business experience and 
different cultural expectations. 
 
The litigated cases and results of our surveys point to an alarming level of 
guarantor misunderstanding about many elements of the transaction. In 
many cases there appeared to be a fundamental misunderstanding about 
the way a mortgage operates. In our consultations consumer advocates 
expressed the view that there is low level of understanding about basic 
                                            
48 Report of the Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability, n 1 at 10; Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law (Report 57, 1992). 
 
49 Guarantor Survey, Respondent 72. 
 
50 See eg the Report of the Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability, n 1 at 10. 
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concepts such as liability (joint, several or secondary) in the general 
community and that some people do not understand what a guarantee is 
at all. It appears there is also a general misunderstanding about the 
obligations for contribution of co-guarantors. 
 
The research found that there was not a simple line that could be drawn 
between understanding and misunderstanding the transaction; rather 
there was a wide range of misunderstandings, assumptions, deceptions 
and half-mistakes that formed a continuum of error. Such errors covers a 
range of issues including: the period of liability; the amount for which they 
could be liable; what their role in the transaction actually was (ie were 
they are guarantor or a borrower) and whether the loan was secured over 
property. 
 
The reasons for the many varieties of misunderstanding are complex: it 
could be that deceit or fraud are involved, or a guarantors lack of 
knowledge is not remedied, or that other social or cultural factors 
impinged on the ability of the guarantor to make an informed decision 
about signing. 
 
This range of confusion or misunderstanding evidenced in the cases and 
survey responses.  
 
“I thought I was a character reference only for my son; thought I 
was a guarantor for my daughter and I had no idea it was a co-
loan.”  
 
“I thought that because the business was in both names just 
thought signature required: didn’t know severally liable… I 
wouldn’t have signed if I knew my liability under the partnership.” 
 
“Actually I thought I was a co-borrower and not a guarantor. I 
asked several times for a copy of the contract to see whose name 
appeared on same. I was not sent one.”  
  
 
Many guarantors were under the mistaken apprehension that they were 
only signing a guarantee for a limited period of time.  
 
The guarantee transaction  
 
If there are unjust circumstances surrounding a guarantee transaction 
(including the circumstances surrounding the execution of the guarantee 
as well as the contract itself) it may be set aside on the basis of equitable 
and common law principles as well as statutory provisions such as the 
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). Such circumstances include inequality 
of bargaining power, unfair tactics and pressure, the inability of the 
guarantor to protect their interests and lack of information or independent 
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advice about the financial and legal effects of the transaction.51 The 
research did not focus upon the application of these legal principles but 
instead explored the transaction from the guarantor’s point of view. The 
following section also discusses the role of legal advice prior to the 
execution of guarantee transactions. 
 
 
The intelligibility of guarantee documents  
 
 
Our research found that guarantee documentation remains very poorly 
understood by guarantors. Guarantors who participated in the survey 
were asked whether they understood or could read the documents that 
they signed to give security for the loan and 27% of respondents stated 
that they could not. Problems identified by guarantors include the use of 
legal jargon and small print in contract documents and the large volume of 
paper. Comments from guarantors also highlight the difficulty in 
comprehending contracts when they do not have an opportunity to take 
the documents away to read and consider them. 
 
“Documents should be easier to read. Any large company should 
fully explain liabilities. Very scary to be confronted by huge 
documents. Simplify documents. Need to make sure people read 
documents, and all of them, so they understand what they have 
signed up for. I did not know I had given a personal guarantee.” 
 
“At time of signing they made me sign so many papers and kept 
turning the pages and saying sign here. No time to read the 
anything.” 
 
 
Through the course of our consultations and surveys, the issue of 
providing guarantors with better documentation and information about 
the guarantee arose. Opinions about the benefits of more information to 
guarantors were mixed. The approach of protecting guarantors “by 
throwing more paper at them” was doubted by some; others thought that 
more plain language documentation with clear warnings would assist. 
Over half of respondents to our guarantor survey said that more written 
and spoken information would have assisted them at the time they signed 
up to be a guarantor.52  
 
                                            
51 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, n 36 at 73. 
 
52 Guarantor Survey, Questions 15(a) and 15(f): 61% stated that more written information would have 
helped them and 55% reported that simple, spoken explanation of their obligations would have helped. 
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 “All Moneys” clauses  
 
Provisions commonly known as “All Moneys” or “All Accounts” clauses are 
used in mortgage and guarantee documents in order to extend the liability 
of a guarantor to future advances by the lender to the borrower. They are 
open-ended and complex and their construction may depend on reading a 
number of documents, such as a personal guarantee and a mortgage 
document, together.53 The “All Moneys” clause is often a term in the 
memorandum of common provisions; this is a separate document to the 
mortgage and the guarantee also executed by a guarantor.54 Such clauses 
are a major concern because guarantors may not be aware at the time they 
enter a transaction that they are providing a guarantee for all money 
owed presently and all money loaned in the future.  
 
Lenders report that such clauses are rarely used. Yet data collected by the 
project revealed a disturbing number of guarantees for unlimited 
amounts. Eighteen per cent of guarantors reported they guaranteed an 
unlimited or indefinite amount of money. Furthermore, 27% of guarantors 
reported they discovered they had given a mortgage over their home that 
contained an “All Moneys” clause only after problems arose with the loan. 
In our review of litigated cases, we found that over half of them involved 
security documents that contained an “All Moneys” mortgage. It appears 
that guarantors who receive legal advice may in fact be more, rather than 
less, likely to be entering into such transactions. Nearly half of solicitors 
and over 80% of barristers reported that on the last occasion they gave 
advice to a guarantor the security documents contained an “All Moneys” 
clause.  
 
 
Information about the borrower’s loan 
 
Guarantors often had little or not knowledge of the financial situation of 
the business or the person borrowing the money prior to signing, and 
received inadequate information from the lender about the state of the 
debt after signing. We found that few people obtained a copy of the 
documents they signed, or a copy of the borrowers contract.55 It is as if the 
borrower takes the money and ‘disappears’. 
                                            
53 See Berna Collier, “‘All debts’ Clauses in Commercial Contracts of Guarantee: Principles of 
Construction and Limitations on the Ambit of Clauses of this Nature” (1998) 24 Monash University 
Law Review 7; Robin Edwards, “Problems with ‘“all moneys”’ Mortgages” (2002) 17 Australian 
Banking and Finance Law Bulletin 151.  
 
54 For example in ANZ Banking Group v Capper [2001] NSWSC 946. 
 
55 37% of respondents received a copy of their contract around the time of signing, 20% received a copy 
of the borrower’s contract around the time of signing. 
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Third party guarantors are rarely in the position of a business partner 
who has an understanding of the business’ prospects and risks. Of 
respondents who guaranteed a business loan, nearly half had little or no 
knowledge of the financial situation of the business at the time the loan 
was taken out. Likewise, 43% reported little or no knowledge of the 
borrower’s personal financial situation. This is consistent with Fehlberg’s 
findings where only four of her 22 guarantors had any knowledge of the 
financial affairs of the business they guaranteed.56
 
The provision of more and better information for prospective guarantors 
has been the focus of earlier reports and inquiries into problems 
experienced by third party guarantees. The Expert Group on Family 
Financial Responsibility recommended compulsory disclosure of 
information held by the lender, which a reasonable guarantor would 
reasonably require, in order to decide whether or not to enter into the 
transaction.57  
 
Industry codes of practice require banks, building societies and credit 
unions to provide prospective guarantors with written information about 
the liabilities of a guarantor, but these are of limited effect.58 The revised 
Code of Banking Practice, effective from August 2003, requires banks 
complying with the Code to provide guarantors with considerably more 
information on the loan prior to entering into the guarantee when it is 
made in favour of an individual or small business.59
 
Whose idea to be guarantor?  
 
Third party guarantors appear unlikely to enter the transaction unless 
requested to do so by the borrower or the lender. Data collected by the 
project confirms that many people agree to act as a guarantor at the 
request of the person borrowing the money. In some cases the guarantee 
was provided at the request of the lender. In only a few cases was the idea 
to become a guarantor their own. 
 
 
                                            
56 Fehlberg, n 3 at 142. 
 
57 Report of the Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability, n1 at 1. 
 
58 See New South Wales Law Reform Commission, n 36 at 71. 
 
59 Code of Banking Practice (2003) cl 28.4. 
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In Belinda Fehlberg’s UK study, she found that the vast majority of 
guarantors (18 of 22) were not involved in the planning or negotiation 
stages of the transaction. Fehlberg defined involvement as a guarantor 
having “the real opportunity while the transaction was being organized 
(not just immediately before the signing) to voice their views to those 
involved other than the debtor.”60 Our research confirmed these findings, 
with our respondents reporting that they were presented with 
documentation in a transaction in which their only role was understood to 
be signing.  This had a clear impact on several issues discussed below, 
including whether the guarantor had time to consider the contract, any 
ability to negotiate the terms of the contract, or the opportunity to receive 
independent legal advice. 
 
Where were the guarantors when they signed and who was present? 
Our research indicates that it is fairly common for mortgage and 
guarantee documents to be signed in the relatively informal surroundings 
such as the family home.  The problem with signing documents at home is 
that the informality of the surroundings is inconsistent with the serious 
and complex nature of the obligations about to be assumed by the 
guarantor and the pressures of home life, such as sick children, make it 
difficult for the prospective guarantor to give her full attention to the 
transaction. It may also mean that the presence of the borrower is more 
likely. 
In our review of litigated cases, 13% involved allegations that the 
documents were signed at the guarantor’s home.  In the several instances 
the guarantor, often a wife, signed the guarantee documents on the 
kitchen or dining table.61 In one case the guarantors’ signatures were 
procured by the borrower (their son-in-law) while they were on holiday in 
Sweden.62
Twenty-two per cent of respondents to the guarantor survey signed the 
security documents at home. One guarantor said she signed the guarantee 
documents in her garage, while the witness to her signature had already 
signed on the document prior to her signature. In one instance, a 
                                            
60 Fehlberg, n 3 at 159. 
 
61 See Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Horkings [2000] VSCA 244; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Khouri [1998] VSC 128; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Liptak (1998) 196 LSJS 466; 
Charles v Parkinson [2000] FCA 1467; Anjoul v Westpac Banking Corporation [2000] NSWCA 355; 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Sarah Marie Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 1. See also Gough v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) ASC 56-270; Westpac Banking Corporation v Bagshaw 
[2000] NSWSC 650 (in the latter two cases the wife’s evidence on this point was rejected in  favour of 
evidence of the bank manager as to his usual practice). 
 
62 State Bank New South Wales v Watt [2002] ACTSC 74. The Court held that even though this was 
contrary to the bank’s own procedures nothing adverse could be drawn from that circumstance. 
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guarantee was signed in hospital, and in another “at the greengrocer’s 
down the road from the bank.” This contrasts with Fehlberg’s study, 
where most guarantors signed at the lender’s premises or a solicitor’s 
office.63 A minority of our respondents signed in a solicitor’s office 
reflecting the fact that very few received legal advice (discussed below). 
 
The Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability recommended that 
the law should require a lender to advise a prospective guarantor to 
execute the guarantee in the absence of the borrower.64 Despite the 
inherent risks associated with presence of the borrower at time the 
guarantor signs the documents the data collected by the project indicates 
that the borrower was frequently present when the guarantor signed.  
 
Forty-seven per cent of respondents in the guarantor survey stated the 
borrower was present when they signed the guarantee documents. 
Twenty-three per cent of guarantors reported that both the borrower and 
the lender were present. Similarly, our review of litigated cases revealed 
that the borrower was often present at the crucial time. In 60% of cases 
the borrower and others (such as the lender, or another guarantor) were 
present, while in 14% of the cases reviewed the borrower alone was 
present with the guarantor at the time of signing.  
 
 
Time to consider the contract?  
 
“The broker just put reams of paper in front of me and said sign here 
etc, it was all done in a hurry.” 
 
Data collected by the project indicates that many people enter guarantor 
transactions in a hurry and with little or poor preparation. One guarantor 
who responded to our survey stated that she signed a guarantee for her 
husband after being taken to the bank by him without any prior notice or 
discussion. As she was not expecting to sign any papers she did not have 
her glasses with her so she was not able to read the documents.  
 
Our research found strong support from guarantors for the introduction of 
cooling off period to allow time to reconsider guarantee transactions before 
they take effect. Fifty-two per cent of respondents said that a cooling off 
period would have helped them.   
 
The following comments come from our guarantor survey. 
                                            
63 Fehlberg, n 3 at 167. 
 
64 See, Report of the Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability, n1 at 1. 
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“Cooling off period also very important. Needs to be more difficult to 
get into these things. Awareness is not enough. Need time to think 
about the consequences. Guarantors should have to sign something 
else acknowledging they understand documents. Signing in front of 
husband and credit provider very difficult. Need time to consider 
documents away from the other person.” 
 
“Would like to see a cooling off period, not so much pressure to sign 
on the day so they can take the car home.” 
 
“Need to explain the transaction especially for young kids. I was 
only 18 when I signed. Need a cooling off period. Wish I had never 
signed.” 
 
 
 
Belinda Fehlberg notes that the guarantors in her study, like those in our 
study, were usually without commercial experience and were not involved 
in the business that they were supporting. Fehlberg argues that this 
combination of factors meant that guarantors were, “particularly unlikely 
to question the requirements of a bank, due to the authority and expertise 
that they perceived banks to have compared to themselves.” Further, she 
adds that even if guarantors had the confidence to question the terms of 
the transaction, “Due to their lack of business experience, they did not 
know the questions to ask”.65 Our research confirms guarantors have a 
poor understanding of the transaction and are therefore not in a position 
to negotiate the terms of the guarantee contract.  
 
 
 
Independent Legal Advice 
 
The presence of legal advice is one factor that is listed in the Contracts 
Review Act 1980 (NSW) as a consideration in determining whether a 
contract is unfair. Recommending independent legal advice is as a factor 
that may relieve a lender of responsibility for unfairness under the High 
Court decision Garcia. It is commonly thought that many lenders now 
insist that guarantors obtain independent legal advice.66  
 
The provision of legal advice has received considerable attention from 
professional bodies regulating the legal profession. The Banking Finance 
                                            
65 Fehlberg, n 3 at 176. Emphasis in original. 
 
66 See eg Anthony Duggan, “Til Debt do us Part: A Note on National Australia Bank  Ltd v Garcia” 
(1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 220 at 227. 
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and Consumer Credit Committee of the Law Council of Australia has 
argued that a consistent national approach to the provision of legal advice 
is in the interests of credit providers, guarantors and lawyers,67 but as yet 
there is no uniform national approach to the use of solicitors’ certificates 
in guarantee transactions. 
 
 
Our research indicates that many guarantors do not obtain independent 
legal advice and that when it was given it was often of very limited utility. 
 
Mark Sneddon has defined adequate independent legal advice as,  
 
“truly independent informed advice which not only explains the 
transaction and its implications but also evaluates the risks involved 
and advises whether the surety should enter into the transaction.”68
 
Using this definition, we identified grave inadequacies in the legal advice 
in the limited number of transactions where it took place. In particular, 
there were problems in the limited scope of advice as well as its 
independence from the borrower and the lender. 
 
Incidence of legal advice  
 
The vast majority of guarantors who responded to our survey, and a high 
proportion of those in our review of the litigated cases, did not receive any 
legal advice prior to entering the transaction. Only 14% of the surveyed 
guarantors reported that they obtained independent legal advice. In only 
29% of the litigated cases we reviewed had the guarantor obtained legal 
advice prior to signing the guarantee. 
 
Disturbingly, only 20% of guarantors reported that anyone - including the 
lender - suggested that they obtain independent legal advice. A closer 
analysis of our survey data revealed that those from non-English speaking 
backgrounds were particularly unlikely to receive independent legal 
advice.  
 
 
                                            
67 See Elizabeth Lanyon, “Aspects of Third Party Guarantees and Solicitors’ Certificates” (2001) 29 
Australian Business Law Review 231 at 241. See also Mark Sneddon, “Lenders and Independent 
Solicitors’ Certificates for Guarantors and Borrowers: Risk Minimisation or Loss Sharing?” (1996) 24 
Australian Business Law Review 5. 
 
68 Mark Sneddon, “Unfair Conduct in Taking Guarantees and the Role of Independent Advice” (199) 
13 University of New South Wales Law Journal 302 at 345. 
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Guarantor’s perceptions of legal advice 
 
Of guarantors who had received legal advice prior to signing, many were 
of the view that it had not greatly assisted them. Nor was there much 
chance for guarantors to reflect upon the advice they received; of the 10 
guarantors in our survey who did received advice and could recall how 
soon they afterwards they signed the contract, five reported that they 
signed the same day, while another two signed within two days.    
 
In two instances, our guarantors reported advice from lawyers that was 
openly partisan to the borrower. In one, only the “positive” aspects of the 
loan were explained, while in another the lawyer pressured the guarantor 
to sign during the interview by saying that if they didn’t sign quickly the 
loan would be reduced and the project would falter. In both of these 
instances, and one additional case, the lawyer was acting for the borrower. 
 
Some guarantors indicated that the advice was perfunctory, with one 
guarantor noting that it took less than fifteen minutes. Another guarantor 
reported that the documents were only partly explained. Only one 
guarantor who responded to our survey reported that the advice clarified 
their thoughts on the document. This was consistent with Fehlberg’s 
finding that as solicitors restricted themselves to a brief explanation of the 
effects of the document, and did not offer advice in the sense of indicating 
whether consenting to the transaction was wise or improvident, 
guarantors consequently did not feel adequately advised.69  
 
Most of the solicitors who responded to our survey perceived their role in 
giving advice as involving explanation of the documents, advice on the 
legal risks of the transaction and the nature and extent of the liability. 
One solicitor stated, “my job remains to explain the legal effect of the 
guarantee, not the wisdom of signing it.” 
 
Fehlberg argues that the term “independent legal advice” as it is 
understood in legal regulation of guarantees is a misnomer; she states 
that, “basic explanation” is a more accurate description of what takes 
place in practice.70
 
Solicitors’ perceptions of their role 
 
About a quarter of the solicitors who responded to our survey described 
their role as ensuring that the guarantor understood the nature of the 
                                            
69 Fehlberg, n 3 at 171. 
 
70 Ibid at 227-8. 
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transaction or what they were doing. A few explicitly described their role 
as involving the protection of the guarantor’s interests. Only a few 
described their role as actively discouraging the client to proceed with the 
transaction. None of the solicitors explicitly described their role as 
ensuring the client was not subject to any undue influence or duress. 
Disturbingly, two solicitors perceived their role as protecting the financial 
institution, and a further six solicitors described their role as formal or 
mechanistic, for example: “My advice was a formality – a lending 
requirement.” 
 
Both professional regulation and judicial decisions concerning legal advice 
to prospective guarantors make a distinction between legal and financial 
advice. Several solicitors made the point that they saw their role as 
providing “legal advice” only.  The current professional conduct rule in 
NSW makes it clear that solicitors must advise the client they are not 
qualified to provide financial (as distinct from legal) advice and that if the 
guarantor has any questions about financial aspects of the transaction 
they should seek further advice from an accountant or financial 
counsellor.71   
 
Numerous commentators have argued that legal advice on the effect of a 
guarantee is of very little assistance in the absence of  financial 
information on the borrower’s position and financial advice on the 
implications of the transaction. Our research indicates that when 
solicitors advise prospective guarantors they do not generally have any 
information regarding the financial position of the borrower. When they do 
have information it is often limited.72 Despite this, most solicitors who 
participated in our survey reported they had sufficient information to 
enable them to give the guarantor useful advice.73 Interestingly, however, 
almost half of all the solicitors reported advising guarantors to seek 
further information or advice before signing the guarantee documents.74
 
 
The “independence” of independent legal advice 
 
                                            
71 Law Society of New South Wales, Professional Conduct and Practice Rules, Rule 45.6.4.1 and 
45.6.4.2. 
 
72 Solicitors Survey, Question 16: 76% of solicitors who responded stated that the last time they gave 
advice to a guarantor they had no information regarding the financial position of the borrower, 24% 
said they did have information. 
 
73 Solicitors Survey, Question 17: 95% of respondents stated that they had sufficient information to give 
useful advice. 
 
74 Solicitor Survey, Question 18: 46% of respondents stated that the last time they gave advice to a 
guarantor they advised them to seek further information or advice before signing. 
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The independence of legal advice may be affected by the solicitor’s or the 
guarantor’s perception of their role if their advice has been arranged by 
the lender, if they are acting for another party in the transaction, or if 
they provide advice in the presence of other parties to the transaction. 
 
While Courts talk about the “scope of the solicitor’s retainer”, in a way 
that implies the solicitor and guarantor explicitly turn their minds to the 
role of the solicitor, there may be considerable confusion about what 
exactly the lawyers duty is and to whom it is owed.  
 
In a number of the litigated cases we reviewed, the solicitor who advised 
the guarantor was organised by either the borrower or the lender.75 The 
guarantor had no control over the content of certificates or statutory 
declarations supplied by the lender or the solicitor which set out the 
matters on which the guarantor was advised. This reflected Fehlberg’s 
findings, that it was usually the borrower who organized the legal advice, 
often retaining a solicitor known to him but not to the guarantor. Even 
when the solicitor was not actually acting for the borrower, this gave 
guarantors the impression that the lawyer in question was not acting for 
them, but was there instead to represent the interests of the borrower or 
lender.76  
 
The potential for conflict of interest is also apparent when the lawyer is 
retained by a party other than the guarantor.77 Of the 11 guarantors from 
our survey who had received legal advice, three reported that they were 
advised by solicitors acting for the borrower, and one by a solicitor acting 
for the lender.   
 
The independence and utility of legal advice may also be compromised if 
the guarantor does not meet with the solicitor alone. In Fehlberg’s study, 
of the 11 guarantors who received legal advice, in seven instances the 
borrower was also present.78 Fehlberg found that while solicitors 
considered that it was not “good practice” to see guarantors in the 
                                            
75 See Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [2000] ANZ ConvR 597; (1999) 75 SASR 1; Pasternacki v 
Correy [2001] ANZ ConvR 240; Sapuppo v Ribchenkov [2002] ANZ ConvR 164; Burrawong 
Investments v Lindsay [2002] QSC 082; Tong v Esanda Finance (Unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 
No 20449/94, Grove J, April 1996); Esanda Finance v Tong (1997) 41 NSWLR 482; Janesland 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Simon and Ors [2000] ANZ ConvR 11. 
 
76 Fehlberg, n 3 at 175-176. 
 
77 See Law Society of New South Wales, Professional Conduct and Practice Rules (1995, amended 
2000) Rule 45.9 and 45.4. However, note in Lang v Licciardello [1999] NSWSC 93, Adams J 
expressed the view “there is no doubt that the most desirable position is that …a mortgagor should be 
given independent legal advice … [but] the supposition that a mortgagee’s solicitor is in conflict with 
the interests of that client if he or she gives advice to the mortgagor on the legal effect of the mortgage 
is a significantly over-simplification of the position” at para 25. 
 
78 Fehlberg, n 3 at 175.  
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presence of borrowers because of the opportunity for pressure or influence 
to be brought to bear, in practice they did little to prevent it. This was 
because guarantors and borrowers often “presented as a package”, and 
because it was usually borrowers who organised the appointment and paid 
for the advice.79 While the majority of solicitors we surveyed reported to us 
that on the last occasion they gave advice, only the guarantor was 
present,80 this may not be an accurate representation. While we did not 
specifically ask guarantors whether anyone else was present when they 
received legal advice, of  the 11 guarantors who had received advice, it was 
clear in four cases that the borrower had been present. Moreover of all 
guarantors, both advised and unadvised, 47% reported that they signed in 
the presence of the borrower, and a further 23% in the presence of both 
the lender and the borrower. 
 
There were also several reported cases in our pool of litigated cases where 
legal advice was clearly provided in the presence of the borrower.81  While 
there has been some adverse judicial comment about the impropriety of 
the borrower being present while the guarantors received legal advice,82 
the practice of giving legal advice in the presence of the borrower has not 
been subject to significant scrutiny to date.  Such practice clearly impacts 
upon the independence and effectiveness of any advice.  
 
 
Claims against solicitors 
 
“The legal profession should not be used by banks etc (who then sue 
solicitors) to provide cheap insurance for banks on loans and for risk 
transference. The primary risk of loans should be borne by lenders who 
make the profit [rather] than guarantors who gain financially or 
emotionally. The role of the solicitor is to oil the wheels (eg explain to the 
guarantor as a matter between the guarantor and legal adviser). It is not 
to provide cheap insurance to a bank  which does not pay the solicitor and 
reserves the right to sue the solicitor or the client, or to force the client to 
sue the solicitor who has assisted by providing a certificate for which a 
mostly paltry payment is received.”83
 
                                            
79 Ibid at 224. 
 
80 Solicitor Survey, Question 13(b): 88% reported that no one else was present; 6% of respondents 
indicated that the borrower was present when they gave the advice. 
 
81 See eg St George Bank Ltd v Trimarchi [2003] NSWSC 151; Tong v Esanda Finance (Unreported, 
NSW Supreme Court, No 20449/94, Grove J, April 1996); Esanda Finance v Tong (1997) 41 NSWLR 
482.   
 
82 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees [2000] ANZ ConvR 597; (1999) 75 SASR 1 at para 702. 
 
83 Solicitor Survey, Respondent 73. 
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There is a concern that the provision of independent legal advice for 
prospective guarantors is a mechanism to shift some of the risk of a 
transaction away from the lender to solicitors and their professional 
indemnity insurance.84 Our survey of solicitors generally reflects this 
view. The focus of much of the material written about the role of solicitors 
is the protection of lenders and solicitors against claims rather than a 
concern for increased consumer understanding.85  
 
In 1999 the New South Wales Law Society reported an increase in the 
number of solicitors joined in legal proceedings as a result of providing 
certificates of legal advice in loan transactions.86 Rule 45 of the Solicitors 
Practice Rules was subsequently amended in 2000 in a climate of great 
concern concerning claims against solicitors for negligent advice to 
guarantors. However our research suggests that this concern was 
somewhat misinformed. The Law Society asserted that LawCover claims 
arising out of the provision of certificates of legal advice rose to 15% of 
total claims during the year 1998-99. Investigation of this claim with 
LawCover reveals this figure to be erroneous. LawCover does not maintain 
separate statistics for losses relating to certificates, however they advised 
that the proportion of claims pursuant to certificates would form part of 
the claims made under other categories, such as mortgage and commercial 
borrowing. In 1999 the combined percentage of claims made under these 
categories was 1.5%.87
 
Our review of litigated cases indicates that solicitors are rarely held to be 
liable for any loss suffered by guarantors. In 77% of the cases we reviewed 
where the guarantor did obtain legal advice, the Court held that the 
advice was satisfactory. In only three of the relevant cases the Court found 
that the solicitor’s advice was inadequate in some respect, and in none of 
those cases was the solicitor found liable for the guarantor’s or lender’s 
loss.88  
 
Nonetheless, just less than half of the solicitors who participated in our 
survey reported that they had concerns about their professional liability in 
                                            
84 See eg Jim O’Donovan, “Guarantees: Vitiating Factors and Independent Advice” (1992) 66 Law 
Society Journal 57 at 60. 
 
85 John Phillips, Bryan Horrigan and Berna Collier, Guarantees and Solicitors’ Certificates Guidelines 
for Lawyers, Financiers and Guarantors (Queensland University of Technology Centre for 
Commercial and Property Law, 1999). 
 
86 Law Society of New South Wales, Caveat 207, 30 December 1999. 
 
87 This includes notification of circumstances and actual claims. Email communication from Ron 
Shorter, General Manager, LawCover Claims, 21 October 2002. 
 
88 Case Law Review, Issue 23; Sapuppo v Ribchenkov [2002] ANZ ConvR 164; Farrow Mortgage 
Services Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Torpey (1998) NSW ConvR 55-857; State Bank of NSW v Hibbert (2000) 
Aust Contract R 90-119. 
 
 30
giving advice to a third party guarantor. Many felt that the process of 
sending guarantors to get independent advice from lawyers in effect 
meant lenders were passing off their obligations to explain the transaction 
on to solicitors, and exposing them to being sued by guarantors, or cross-
claimed against by lenders if the guarantee goes wrong. One solicitor said 
lawyers “should not be made “co-guarantors” by being exposed to 
proceedings in this way”.  
 
 
 
Who benefits from independent legal advice? 
 
Do guarantors obtain any benefit from the provision of legal advice? Sue 
Mahalingham notes that, 
 
“The precise role played by independent legal advice is not well 
understood. Independent advice has two distinct functions in 
loan transactions. For lenders it plays a protective role, shielding 
them from the effects of misconduct of a third party or 
countering allegations of unfair conduct. For the family security 
provider, it is thought that independent advice will eliminate 
underlying unfairness by ensuring that the family security 
provider has made an informed, independent and voluntary 
decision in providing security.”89
 
 
Our research suggests that it is questionable whether the provision of 
legal advice actually deters vulnerable guarantors from proceeding with 
the transaction. This reflects Felhlberg’s finding that very few of her 
respondents  would have been deterred from the transaction by even 
thorough and impartial legal advice.90
 
Solicitors also reported that despite providing strong advice about the 
risks of the transaction, most guarantors proceed with the transaction.91 
According to some solicitors, by the time some guarantors come for 
compulsory advice, they have already made up their mind. One barrister 
commented that while independent advice may act as a deterrent to 
signing, by the time the advice is given the guarantor probably already 
feels morally committed to the borrower to execute the guarantee. This 
sentiment is corroborated by other survey data which indicates that much 
                                            
89 Sue Mahalingham, n 19. 
 
90 Fehlberg, n 3 at 172. 
 
91 Solicitors Survey, Question 22(a): of those solicitors who advised against signing 89% reported that 
the client went ahead despite the warning. 
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of the negotiating about the loan, and the exigencies surrounding the 
pressing need for finance have already proceeded to such a point that the 
only thing required, and that is inevitable, is the guarantor’s signature. 
Only one solicitor reported the view that the client listens to the legal 
advice then makes a commercial decision. 
 
The comments from solicitors who responded to our survey also point to 
the ways in which feelings of connection and obligation arising out of 
personal or family relationships govern the decision of the guarantor to 
proceed with the transaction rather than any objective advice about the 
dangers of the transaction. Family pressure, or the family relationship 
between the borrower and guarantor, were nominated by a number as 
solicitors as the reason guarantors proceeded with the transaction. 
Another solicitor identified “moral obligation” while another said: “family 
will always guarantee family”. 
 
One solicitor commented: 
 
“Most if not all guarantors will proceed regardless of any advice 
given for emotional reasons, and regardless of any disclosure or 
information supplied. The only way to protect guarantors is to 
prohibit certain classes of guarantees.”92
 
 
Lenders benefit from the provision of independent legal advice because the 
certificate or statutory declaration verifying legal advice acts as a shield to 
deflect any later claims by the guarantor that the guarantee should not be 
enforced because they did not understand the transaction or were at a 
special disadvantage in the transaction. One respondent suggested that 
this is in fact the sole benefit of legal advice:  
 
“As it stands, the requirement of independent legal advice only 
serves the purpose of covering and protecting the lending 
institutions’ interests – if consumers are losing protection as a 
result of unrealistic and unhelpful legal independent advice then 
such consumer protection is meaningless and without substance.” 
 
 
It appears that further attention and deeper analysis needs to be directed 
to the provision and utility of independent legal advice.  
 
When the loan went wrong 
 
                                            
92 Solicitor Survey, Comments, Respondent 78. 
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“I kept phoning the bank to check if my son had made any payments. 
He had not. I always kept them up to date with his latest address. 
They did not try to find him and just came after me. I paid out in full 
to avoid further stress. Solicitor said I had to pay it anyway. Four 
years later I received harassing phone calls from a collection agency. 
It was very stressful. They would not believe I had paid it. I went to 
the banking Ombudsman who helped me to get [the bank] to stop the 
collection agency making more demands. Due to ill health I only work 
part time. Paying back the loan was a huge burden I still have not 
recovered from. I am also estranged from my son who has had a very 
good job these past eight years.”  
 
 
Belinda Fehlberg found that most of her study participants only became 
aware of the extent of their liability once the bank began enforcement 
action, and often were unaware that there had been further advances 
upon the original loan until that point.93  Our research was consistent 
with this finding; few guarantors received information about the loan 
during the period of the loan and guarantors generally only become aware 
of problems when their legal responsibilities were tested in times of 
trouble.94 Around three-quarters of respondents to the guarantor survey 
reported that they personally received no information about whether the 
primary borrower was keeping up their repayments or received any 
information about any increase in the amount guaranteed.95 One 
guarantor stated, “I was given no information whatsoever. You are the 
last to know if your borrower does not tell you.”  
 
The data from the research points to a poor level of communication 
between the lender and the guarantor. These failures in communication 
relate to all areas of the life of the guarantee: from the basic details of the 
obligations under the guarantee, to informing the guarantor about the 
borrower’s default. 
 
While the reach of industry codes of practice is limited, lenders are 
required by most codes to send the guarantor a copy of any formal demand 
that is sent to the primary borrower.96 Such requirements are, however, 
                                            
93 Fehlberg, n 3 at 236. 
 
94 See, for example, Supriya Singh’s study of women and family businesses which found women 
generally only became aware of their liabilities in business when there were marriage and/or business 
difficulties or failures. Supriya Singh, n  1 at 18-19. 
 
95 Guarantor Survey Question 25(a): 74%; Guarantor Survey Question 25(b): 77%. 
 
96 Code of Banking Practice (1993) s 20, Building Society Code of Practice (1994) s 20, and Credit 
Union Code of Practice (1994) s 20. Note that the Code of Banking Practice has been amended to 
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subject to the consent of the borrower.97 The problems associated with 
disclosure of information and consent have been discussed at length in the 
Final Report of the Review of the Code of Banking Practice.98
 
Apart from the financial burden the costs of becoming a guarantor can be 
enormous. Belinda Fehlberg notes in her UK study that guarantors 
reported grave physical and emotional costs.99 Most respondents to our 
guarantor survey reported that their relationship with the primary 
borrower had changed as a result of the loan. The responses 
overwhelmingly indicated the relationship had gone awry: the vast 
majority had divorced, separated or ceased all contact. Of the few that had 
maintained their previous relationship, all reported a lack of trust, a rise 
in antagonism, contempt or resentment. In most cases where the borrower 
was a spouse, the couples had separated at the time of the survey; or if 
still together, the relationship was strained. In most cases where the 
guarantor/borrower relationship was a parent/child relationship, the loan 
resulted in a lack of trust between family members. A great many 
reported that they are completely estranged from each other.  
 
Many guarantors reported an enormous emotional strain and stress which 
some felt lead to serious illness; some said the transaction and stress 
nearly “ruined” their lives. Others reported that they felt “foolish” or 
humiliated by the whole experience; and stated that they now find it 
difficult to trust people.  
 
Enforcement and dispute resolution 
 
It appears that many guarantors simply pay the debts of others rather 
than dispute a transaction. Almost a third of respondents to the guarantor 
survey reported that they had paid the loan back in part or full. Twenty-
four per cent still owed money to the lender, and 8% of guarantors had 
gone bankrupt. Eighteen per cent were disputing the debt. Of the 
remainder of respondents, many were trying to refinance to prevent 
possession of their homes, some managed to get the primary borrower to 
start repayments and a few had settled. 
 
                                                                                                                             
include small business transactions in its jurisdiction. Those amendments are effective from August 
2003. 
 
97 In the case of banks and building societies, but not in the case of credit unions. 
 
98 Dick Viney, Review of the Code of Banking Practice, Final Report (2001). 
 
99 Fehlberg, n 3 at 253-258. 
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Almost 60% of solicitor respondents reported that their matters settled, 
with almost 70% of those matters settling during litigation, and 30% 
settling before litigation. Of those matters that proceeded to litigation, 
only 5% went to ADR. Of those that settled, the majority settled on terms 
more favourable to the lender than the guarantor. 
There was a high level of dissatisfaction with legal processes from 
guarantors. This was reflected in the responses of solicitors and barristers, 
regardless of whether they acted for guarantors or lenders.  
“Litigation is not a satisfactory process – it forces people to be 
defensive (ie, it’s not my fault) rather than solution oriented. It also 
adds a significant prospective financial burden of legal costs – both 
during and after.”100
 
Some lawyers commented that the heavy-handed methods adopted by 
lenders in enforcing securities mean that chances of settlement are 
diminished. One solicitor stated: 
“the [financial] institutions can afford to, and do in fact, work up 
huge costs of recovery which then form part of the principal sum, 
eat up any equity in the security, and kill all prospects of 
settlement.”101
 
Many lawyers and judges expressed the view that litigation was 
expensive, complex and inefficient for the resolution of guarantee disputes 
and expressed a preference for more accessible dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as mediation, industry resolution or tribunal processes. 
Yet of the few such processes in existence, we found that they were very 
little used.  
 
The Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman was approached by only 
7% of surveyed guarantors. The ABIO’s own figures show that guarantee 
matters form a very low percentage of its closed complaints. There are 
several limitations to the jurisdiction of the ABIO, including monetary 
limits and the fact that commencement of litigation ousts its jurisdiction. 
The maximum amount in dispute that the ABIO can hear is $150,000 – 
and this sum includes the costs of enforcement. Given the high costs of 
residential premises and of enforcement, it is very unlikely that any 
guarantee secured over domestic property would come within the ABIO’s 
jurisdiction.  
 
                                            
100 Solicitor Survey, Respondent 6. 
 
101 Barrister Survey, Respondent 26. 
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Another accessible dispute resolution forum is the Consumer, Trader and 
Tenancy Tribunal (CTTT) of NSW. The CTTT only has jurisdiction over 
loan transactions by virtue of the Consumer Credit Code in NSW.102 The 
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction under the Contracts Review Act 1980 
(NSW) or any common law jurisdiction to hear claims of unconscionability. 
Our research found that very few third party guarantee disputes are being 
resolved under the Consumer Credit Code. This lack of usage is likely to 
be caused by the consumer/business distinction drawn in the Consumer 
Credit Code. Small business transactions are excluded from the Consumer 
Credit Code; so where the purpose of the loan is commercial rather than 
personal, the CTTT has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. Applications 
brought by guarantors to the CTTT have been dismissed on this basis.103 
Our research found strong support for increased involvement by lower cost 
tribunals, such as the NSW Consumer Tenancy and Trading Tribunal in 
cases involving third party guarantees in order to overcome some of the 
problems of the high cost of litigation, but this is clearly not possible under 
the current jurisdictional restrictions of the Tribunal. 
 
 
Litigation 
  
  
While a range of common law and statutory remedies may be available to 
guarantors who seek to challenge the enforcement of a guarantee,104 these 
remedies are discretionary and open to a range of interpretation by the 
courts. The Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability concluded 
that the legal doctrines with respect to third party guarantees were highly 
technical and complex and expensive to litigate. The Expert Group 
recommended reconsideration and clarification of the common law.105 Our 
research confirms that there is a lack of uniformity in the decided cases 
and that litigation in this area is expensive and complex. Delay and the 
high costs of litigation and enforcement of guarantees emerged from the 
research as issues of concern. 
 
                                            
102 Consumer Credit (New South Wales) Code 1995 and Regulations. 
 
103 See Park Avenue Nominees Pty Ltd v Boon (2001) ASC 155-052; (2001) ASC 155-045. 
 
104 See generally, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, n 36; John Carter and David Harland, 
Contract Law in Australia, (4th ed, Butterworths, 2002) Chapters 14 and 15; David Harland, 
“Unconscionable and Unfair Contracts: An Australian Perspective” in Brownsword, Hird and Howells 
(eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (Ashgate, 1999). 
 
105 Report of the Expert Group on Family Financial Vulnerability, n1 at 36-37. 
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Litigation is rarely instigated by the guarantor; in our review of litigated 
cases we found that in 76% of cases litigation was commenced by the 
lender. Litigation most commonly starts with a claim by the lender for 
possession of the security given by the guarantor which in most cases is 
the family home of the guarantor.106 Guarantors are therefore almost 
always on the defensive, belatedly marshalling evidence as to why the 
guarantee should not be enforced. This has clear implications for how 
litigation is run, and is evident in the often disorganised and scattergun 
approach to defences that we found. 
 
 
Our review of litigated cases indicates that a range of defences and cross 
claims are used by guarantors to defend claims, make cross claims and in 
some cases initiate claims.107 The most prominent of these are unjustness 
under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), and unconscionability, 
including the ‘special wives’ equity’ affirmed in Garcia.108 This was 
confirmed in barrister and solicitor surveys. Other common defences or 
cross claims are those based on undue influence, the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), misrepresentation and non 
est factum. Our review of litigated cases found that guarantors were 
commonly pleading from three to six different claims or defences. 
Barristers and solicitors confirmed that guarantors are very likely to rely 
on more than one defence and cross claim.  In at least half of the litigated 
cases in our review late amendments - either just before or during trial - 
were made to the pleadings. Judges confirmed that late amendments are a 
marked feature of third party guarantee cases. 
 
Solicitors, barristers and judges all agreed that litigation in this area is 
often technical, lengthy and complex. Interlocutory applications are also 
common in third party guarantee matters, with many matters being 
subject to strike-out or summary judgment applications by lenders.109 
These applications can substantially increase the costs of litigation, and 
may serve as a serious impediment for those impecunious guarantors 
seeking access to the courts for redress.  
                                            
106 Case Law Review, Issue 12: in 88% of litigated cases the family home was mortgaged as security for 
the guarantee.  
 
107 For an overview of the requirements of common law and statutory claims of unfairness, see New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission, n 36, Chapter 2. 
 
108 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395.  
 
109 One judge commented that in five years on the bench, he had only presided on one trial involving a 
guarantee, but had dealt with between 10 to 20 applications by notice of motion to strike out or amend 
defences or claims, or applications to set aside judgments. 
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From the perspective of a guarantor who seeks to challenge enforcement 
proceedings simply filing a defence and cross claim and taking some initial 
preparatory steps in the litigation will cost around $3,000 to $4,000. It is 
not always possible to obtain a true picture of the case until well into the 
litigation when, according to one solicitor, costs may have ballooned out to 
$30,000. Most solicitors stated that litigation is expensive for both sides, 
and that the enforcement process used by lender resulted in higher costs. 
Many guarantee contracts contain a specific provision allowing the lender 
to claim all reasonable costs of recovery from the guarantor.110  
  
We examined the impact of the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) and the 
High Court decision of Garcia v National Australia Bank (1998), both of 
which are perceived as providing fairly generous avenues of relief for 
guarantors. In our analysis of litigated cases we confirmed that the 
Contracts Review Act does indeed provide a broader and more flexible 
approach to assessing unfair dealing than common law doctrines. However 
we also noted that the Act was applied with considerable inconsistency. 
We confirmed a trend noted by other researchers, towards partial rather 
than complete relief under the Act. 111  
 
 
The 1998 decision of the High Court in Garcia112 confirmed that the 
“special wives’ equity” in Yerkey v Jones113 had survived.  This rule holds 
that if a wife is a volunteer to a transaction, and does not understand its 
effects in essential respects, she may be able to have it set aside, even in 
the absence of unfair dealing, if the lender did not take steps to explain 
the transaction or to recommend advice was sought. At the time of the 
decision, there were fears that Garcia would unleash a floodgate of claims 
against lenders.114 However such fears appear to have been unfounded. In 
                                            
110 Solicitor Survey, Question 12: 91% of solicitors reported the last time they gave advice to a 
guarantor the contract contained a provision allowing the lender to claim all reasonable costs of 
recovery. Also, Question 30: 91% of solicitors said the last time they acted for a guarantor in 
enforcement proceedings the contract contained a provision allowing the lender to claim all reasonable 
costs of recovery. 
 
111 Tyrone Carlin, “The Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) – 20 Years On” (2001) 23  Sydney Law 
Review 125 at 135. 
 
112 Garcia v National Australia Bank (1998) 194 CLR 395. 
 
113 Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649. 
 
114 See, for example, Steven Mackay “Banks Don’t Always Finish Last” (2002) 16 Property Law 
Bulletin 41; Anne Finlay, “Unconscionable Conduct and the Business Plaintiff: Has Australia Gone 
Too Far?” (1999) 28 Anglo-American Law Review 470; David Purcell, “Guarantees: their facts and 
their validity” (2002) NSW Young Lawyers Continuing Legal Education Seminar Papers. 
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58% of litigated cases in the pool we surveyed, the guarantor sought to 
rely on the principle confirmed in Garcia.115 Guarantors were successful 
on the basis of this equity in only 27% cases where it was claimed.  
 
We found considerable uncertainty about the scope and application of the 
principle. While some decisions have applied the principle to de facto 
spouses,116 another held that only formal marriages are covered by the 
principle.117 There has been similar division over whether the principle 
extends to elderly parents,118 while the claims of in-laws, clients who 
relied upon their trust in solicitors, and close friends have all been denied 
in the cases reviewed.119  
 
We found even greater variation over interpretation and application of the 
Garcia requirement that the claimant be a “volunteer” to the transaction 
in order to be entitled to relief. Our analysis of relevant decisions since 
Garcia suggests that courts have had considerable difficulty in 
determining who is a volunteer in guarantee transactions, particularly 
those for the benefit of a family business. 120
 
In many cases involving a wife who guarantees loans to a family company, 
she is also on paper a director or shareholder of the company. In many 
decisions the court has imputed a director with knowledge about the 
company, regardless of her control, involvement or understanding of the 
company’s affairs.121 In other cases the courts have been prepared to look 
at the substance rather than the form of the wife’s involvement in the 
company. These decisions have found that women are still volunteers and 
not in fact owners or beneficiaries if the wealth of the company is 
                                                                                                                             
 
115 Case Law Review, Question 27. The Case Law Review  only considered cases decided post-Garcia. 
 
116 Liu v Adamson[2003] NSWSC 74.  
 
117 State Bank of New South Wales v Hibbert (2000) Aust Contract R 90-119; [2000] NSWSC 628. 
 
118 See State Bank of New South Wales Limited v Layoun [2001] ANZ ConvR 487; [2001] NSWSC 113 
accepting that the principle covered parents and  Watt v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [2003] 
ACTCA 7 rejecting it.  
 
119 See National Australia Bank v Starbronze Pty Ltd (2001) V ConvR 54-640; [2000] VSC 325; 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai [2002] ANZ ConvR 597; [2002] QSC 175; 
Equitiloan Securities v Mulrine [2000] ACTSC 48. 
 
120 For an outline of the principles and relevant cases see: State Bank of NSW v Chia (2000) 50 NSWLR 
587 at 601. 
 
121State Bank of NSW v Watt [2002] ACTSC 74; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Ridout Nominees 
Pty Ltd [2000] WASC 37. 
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controlled by the husband and any benefit comes to her as a result of his 
“discretion” rather than as a right.122  
 
If a guarantor has received benefit from the loan transaction then she is 
not a volunteer and the protections of Garcia do not apply. The difficulty 
facing the courts is in determining what constitutes a benefit. In some 
cases, Courts have assumed that a benefit for one partner in a 
relationship, or to a family company, necessarily translates to a benefit for 
the guarantor. In other cases, benefit is construed less strictly: sometimes 
the court considers who makes the decisions about where funds from an 
enterprise are directed. There is considerable uncertainty: an intangible 
benefit which flows through a family unit from a spousal guarantee will 
not necessarily undermine reliance on Garcia principles,123 although it has 
been held to in several cases.124
  
 
The perception that banks and other lenders “always finish last” when a 
guarantor challenges the enforcement of a guarantee was not confirmed in 
our research.125 While guarantors were partially or fully successful in 35% 
of the litigated cases we reviewed, these case in themselves represent a 
very small fraction of disputed transactions.  Data from the solicitor’s 
survey confirms that in most cases the lender is largely successful in 
pursuing the guarantee, even in disputed transactions.126
 
Implications of this research 
 
The objectives of law and policy reform in this area involve a tension 
between the need to protect guarantors, secure finance  for small business, 
                                            
122 See eg, Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Horkings [2000] VSCA 244; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Khouri [1998] VSC 128; Armstrong v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2000] ANZ 
ConvR 470; [1999] NSWSC 588; Cranfield Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] VSC 
140. 
 
123 Bylander v Multilink [2001] NSWCA 53. See Bryan Horrigan, “Unconscionability breaks new 
ground – avoiding and litigating unfair client conduct after ACCC test cases and financial services 
reform” (2002) 7 Deakin Law Review 4. 
 
124Commonwealth Bank v Liptak (1998) 196 LSJS 466; Radin v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
[1998] FCA 1361. Susan Barkehall Thomas reviews several cases and is critical of Radin, see: “Garcia 
v National Australia Bank: Would the Real Volunteer Please Stand Up?” (1999) 14 Journal of 
International Banking Law 319. 
 
125 Mackay states “Over the last few years, most banks could be forgiven for thinking that they were 
unlikely to succeed in any action against them by a disgruntled borrower…..”: Mackay, n 114 at 41. 
 
126 Solicitor Survey, Question 40: 50% of respondents reported that in the last case they acted in, the 
guarantor paid the debt with interest, 5% said the guarantor paid most of the debt, 9% said the 
guarantor was partially released from the debt and 9% said the guarantor was wholly released. 
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and provide some measure of certainty in procedure, practice and outcome 
for borrowers, guarantors, lenders and legal advisers. This research does 
not suggest particular reform measures, but rather highlights key findings 
and suggests how these findings need to be considered by, and may impact 
upon, future developments in law and policy. Implications of this research 
are divided into two areas: firstly, pre-transaction conduct, and secondly, 
dispute resolution after a guarantee is disputed. 
Pre-transaction conduct 
Guarantors in positions of vulnerability 
This research clearly indicates that women, elderly people and those from 
non-English speaking backgrounds are  disproportionately affected by 
third party guarantees. This highlights the need to consider these groups 
as the prime demographic of guarantors, and to specifically target them in 
any reform or education measures.  
Many guarantors we surveyed were in positions of vulnerability, either 
because of their emotional connection with the borrower or because of 
structural factors. These findings suggest that there are significant issues 
of power imbalance in guarantor/borrower and guarantor/lender 
relationships that may not necessarily be resolved by the provision of more 
or better information. 
Guarantor relationships and gender 
While women are mostly involved as guarantors of their male partner’s 
borrowing, the smaller number of men who are involved as guarantors 
tend to be the parent of the primary borrower. Women and men noted 
many of the same reasons for entering into the transaction, such as trust 
and optimism, but there were very marked differences in key areas. 
Women were far more likely to report that they entered the guarantee 
because they were pressured, scared or felt that they had no choice. 
Women also appear far more likely to be economically dependent upon the 
borrower, such that their choices are constrained. 
Men’s and women’s experiences of guarantee transactions appear to be 
quite different, and any reform and education measures need to be careful 
to identify guarantor needs and experiences by gender. 
Informational disparity  
It appears common for guarantors to sign in situations where they have 
little information or are mis-informed about key aspects of the transaction. 
Guarantors rarely have any information about the borrower’s loan or 
about the health of the business they are supporting and so are unable to 
assess the risk they are taking. Such information is clearly necessary to 
enable even the possibility of an informed choice about the transaction. 
Guarantee documentation is lengthy, complex and on occasion 
incomprehensible even to the legally trained. While plain language 
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documentation may not prevent guarantors from entering into 
improvident transactions, it would, like the provision of other information 
and advice, assist in giving at least the opportunity for some real choice to 
be exercised.  
The inclusion of “All Moneys” clauses is still apparently occurring in 
guarantee transactions. Such clauses in and of themselves enhance the 
likelihood that guarantors will be placed in an ill-informed and 
disadvantaged position in the guarantee process. 
The circumstances of signing 
It appears disturbingly common that guarantee  transactions are carried 
out in informal surroundings and/or in the presence of the borrower. It 
was very common for our surveyed guarantors to have little time to 
consider the terms of the agreement. The guarantee transactions in our 
study almost always took place in the absence of adequate legal or 
financial advice. These factors contributed to guarantors’ poor 
understanding of their obligations and to depriving them of an opportunity 
of informed choice.  
These findings contradict what is understood as good practice – and 
commonly assumed to be typical practice - in this area. Good lender 
practice, as set out in lenders’ own policy manuals, requires guarantors to 
sign at the lender’s premises in formal circumstances, in the absence of 
the borrower and following the receipt of independent legal advice. 
These findings suggest that more attention must be given to compliance 
with good practice in the taking of guarantees at both an industry and 
regulatory level. If self regulation measures do not have sufficient 
industry coverage or are ineffective, increased regulation should be 
considered. 
 
Legal advice 
 
There is a sharp disparity between what courts, lenders and policy-makers 
understand to be the scope and content of independent legal advice and 
what is delivered in practice. “Independent legal advice” is in practice 
merely a “basic explanation” of the content of legal documents.  
 
These findings have serious implications in terms of the development of 
guarantor protections, which until now, have contained a heavy focus 
upon independent legal advice as a cure for unfair dealing, a source of 
information or empowerment for the guarantor, and as a protection 
against lender liability. While the presence of legal advice may protect a 
lender from an action to set aside the transaction, such advice as it is 
currently typically provided does not appear to offer the guarantor very 
much in terms of information on the loan, advice on the transaction, or 
empowerment to refuse or renegotiate the terms of the transaction. 
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Lack of regulation 
 
The pre-transaction conduct of the taking of guarantees still appears 
largely unregulated and shows little evidence of what either the finance 
industry or consumer advocates would regard as best, or even adequate, 
practice. 
 
There appears to be a need for clear and consistent standards of conduct 
across the entire lender industry. 
 
Post-transaction disputes  
 
Litigation is inadequate 
 
If there is any dispute over the guarantee transaction, the available 
avenues for redress are clearly inadequate. Informal and accessible 
dispute resolution mechanisms that currently exist are very limited in 
their operation and utility. Litigation, with its associated expense and 
complexity, still remains the principal focus of dispute resolution in this 
area. 
 
Litigation is complex, protracted, expensive and often poorly conducted. 
Litigation is fiercely and desperately fought in many matters, and may 
often add considerably to the final costs even when settlement is achieved 
at some stage in the process. 
 
Costs  
 
The inclusion of “all reasonable costs of recovery” clauses is very common 
in guarantee transactions. These costs are in addition to the principal sum 
and interest, and include legal costs and the costs of pursing the borrower 
and the guarantor. They can amount to many tens of thousands of dollars 
before litigation has even commenced. These clauses transfer a significant 
portion of the risk of lending – the transaction costs of recovery -  from 
lenders to guarantors. 
 
Such clauses act as a powerful disincentive for lenders to negotiate, to 
settle claims or engage in lower cost forms of dispute resolution, as their 
legal costs and costs of recovery are contractually borne by the guarantor 
and can be automatically deducted from secured assets. 
Need for certainty 
The current array of common law and legislative avenues to challenge 
unfair transactions has contributed to the complexity of litigation.  
The application of legal principles – particularly the Contracts Review Act  
and the “special equity” for wives in Garcia -  in decided cases has been 
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inconsistent and further contributed to uncertainty. It appears that the 
range of legal principles are too uncertain in their application for any 
degree of predictability in this area.  
Greater certainty in the operative law in this area could reduce litigation 
and provide both lenders and guarantors with a better sense of what 
conduct and factors will render a transaction unenforceable. 
The need for accessible dispute resolution  
While many matters settle in negotiation between lawyers, there are very 
few structured avenues of accessible or informal dispute resolution in this 
area. 
The industry and tribunal level dispute resolution processes that do exist 
are very little used. This under-use appears to be principally caused by 
jurisdictional limits such as low monetary limits on the value of the 
dispute and limited application to “consumer” rather than “business” 
transactions. As a large portion of guarantees are secured by residential 
properties and are undertaken to support small business borrowing, the 
jurisdictional limits of current avenues render them virtually useless.  
There is a clear need for a relatively even playing field in which disputed 
transactions can be heard and adjudicated, in addition to avenues for 
mediated or negotiated settlements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite protections such as the Consumer Credit Code (in operation since 
1996) and voluntary self-regulation mechanisms such as the Code of 
Banking Practice (in place since 1993 and widely adopted),127 guarantors 
continue to enter into transactions with a very poor understanding of what 
their obligations are. Lenders also continue to provide funds to borrowers 
supported by guarantees when neither the borrower nor the guarantor, 
upon a careful assessment, is able to repay the amount. The pre-
transaction conduct of the taking of guarantees still appears largely 
unregulated and shows little evidence of what either the finance industry 
or consumer advocates would regard as best, or even adequate, practice. 
 
                                            
127 Code of Banking Practice (1993). Banks that had adopted the Code as at August 2002 were: 
Adelaide Bank Limited, AMP Bank Limited, Arab Bank (Australia) Limited, Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Limited, Bank of China, Bank of Western Australia Ltd (Bankwest), Bank of 
Queensland Limited, Bendigo Bank Limited, Citibank Limited, Colonial State Bank, Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia, HSBC Bank Australia Limited, ING Mercantile Mutual Bank (Australia) Ltd, 
Macquarie Bank Limited, National Australia Bank Limited, Primary Industry Bank of Australia 
Limited, St George Bank Limited, Suncorp-Metway Limited, Westpac Banking Corporation. 
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Some of the problematic areas relating to guarantee practice may be 
assisted by the new provisions of the Code of Banking Practice.128 From 
August 2003 the Code of Banking Practice has greater coverage and 
enhanced guarantor protections. The Code now covers guarantees for 
small business transactions in addition to consumer transactions, and has 
enhanced requirements for the provision of pre-transaction information to 
guarantors.129 However the Code will continue to be a voluntary source of 
regulation so it remains to be seen what impact it will have upon the pre-
transaction conduct of bank lenders.  
 
Clearly, although many steps have been taken to improve policy and best 
practice in this area, this research demonstrates that much remains to be 
done.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
128 See Murray Brown, “The Garcia Code” (2003) 14 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and 
Practice 17. 
 
129 Code of Banking Practice (2003), in particular Cl 28, Cl 40. 
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